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Mine Action Support for
Armed Violence Reduction:
NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
Although there is no international consensus on the
definition of armed violence, this policy brief uses the
definition put forward by the Geneva Declaration on
Armed Violence and Development, which defines
armed violence as the “intentional use of illegitimate
force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives
against a person, group, community, or state, which undermines people-centred security and/or sustainable
development.”1

demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes;
community safety programmes; small-arms/light
weapons (SALW) and ammunition disposal; physical
security and stockpile management (PSSM); and security sector/system reform (SSR). While some of these
activities are strictly dedicated to reducing armed violence, others, such as SALW control, ammunition disposal and PSSM, also contribute to increased public
safety and accident prevention (eg, depot explosions).

Under this definition, armed violence reduction (AVR)
refers to any action or activity that contributes to a decrease in armed violence. These may include, among
others: certain peace building activities; disarmament,

For the purpose of this policy brief, the terms ‘AVR’ and
‘AVR-related’ will refer to both strict armed violence
reduction as well as wider public safety interventions.

Mission Creep or Responding to
Wider Security Needs?
GICHD POLICY BRIEF | DECEMBER 2012
SUMMARY2
This policy brief is based on the findings of a study undertaken by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) in 2011-12 on the role of mine action organisations in supporting armed
violence reduction at an operational level. This policy brief examines the increasing involvement of mine
action organisations in efforts to reduce armed violence and promote public safety. It looks briefly at how
the focus on AVR has developed and the types of programmes that mine action organisations are implementing, as well as the rationale for this shift from ‘traditional’ mine action to AVR. It concludes with a summary
of key findings and lessons learnt.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, a study undertaken by the GICHD found that there were few
examples of existing synergies between SALW programmes and mine action.
However, the study noted that there was scope for using mine action technical
expertise “…to manage the explosive threat through mines/ERW (Explosive
Remnants of War) clearance, SALW collection, and ammunition stockpile
reduction, including by destruction and demilitarisation.”3
The purpose of this policy brief is to illustrate how an increasing number of
mine action organisations are using their mine action technical expertise and
their capacities to operate in difficult environments to reduce armed violence
and promote public safety. Several organisations now have AVR-related
policies, programmes and staff in place. For example:
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>

Danish Demining Group (DDG) has developed an AVR framework4
and is implementing community safety programmes in Somaliland, South
Sudan, Uganda and Yemen

>

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) uses the term AVR5 to describe its work
on identifying stockpiles and ammunition, stockpile assistance and safe
storage, destruction of surplus and obsolete weapons and ammunition,
and marking and tracing weapons

>

Several organisations are implementing Physical Security and Stockpile
Management programmes (eg, DDG, Swiss Demining Foundation (FSD),
HALO Trust, MAG, Organisation of American States (OAS), United
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)) to improve the security of armouries and storage depots, strengthen ammunition management capacity,
reduce the risks of unplanned explosions and prevent theft from stockpiles

>

Action On Armed Violence6 (AOAV) is implementing a reintegration
training programme in Liberia for ex-combatants, and HALO Trust
employs and trains ex-combatants as deminers in Afghanistan, both of
which support broader DDR efforts

>

In addition to mine risk education, Handicap International (HI), DanChurchAid and DDG also deliver SALW risk education to prevent SALWrelated accidents, raise awareness and reduce the impact of SALW misuse
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Despite the expanding number and scope of these
interventions, limited information is available on
programme objectives, methodologies and results
achieved. While research has been done on the role
of mine/ERW operators beyond mine action, this
research has largely focused on peace-building.
Furthermore, virtually no guidance has been developed for mine action organisations on how to implement
and support programmes that try to reduce armed
violence and improve public safety.
To address this gap, the GICHD study7 consisted
of a series of case studies (see Box 1) that profiled
different organisations, highlighting programme
scope, methodology and results, and the rationale
behind the expansion beyond mine action into AVR.
The overall goal of the case studies and this policy
brief is to share key lessons learnt, provide practical
guidance for the mine action community, and strengthen collaboration between mine action organisations
and those focussing specifically on AVR-related
programmes.
Box 1 | List of case studies
The GICHD Mine Action and AVR study included the following twelve country case studies:

>

Albania Mine and Munitions Coordination Ofﬁce’s
and DanChurchAid’s UXO hotspot clearance project
in Albania

>

AOAV’s post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration
programme in Liberia

>

DanChurchAid’s SALW awareness raising project in
Burundi

>

DDG’s Community Safety Programmes in Somaliland
and Uganda

>

HALO Trust’s reintegration of former combatants into
demining in Afghanistan

>

HI’s SALW risk awareness project in Libya

>

MAG’s PSSM programmes in Burundi and Somaliland

>

OAS’s SALW and munitions destruction programme
in Guatemala

>

UNMAS’s PSSM project in Côte d’Ivoire

>

UNMAS’s rapid response project in Congo-Brazzaville

Before examining the different types of AVR-related
programmes that mine action organisations are implementing and the factors which have motivated
this shift to AVR, the following section provides
some background on how discussions on armed
violence reduction have evolved.
FROM SALW CONTROL TO AVR:
THE EVOLUTION
Increased international attention and policy dialogue
on the need to reduce armed violence stem from
international efforts to address the illicit trade and
proliferation of SALW. Initially, SALW control programmes focused on reducing the availability or
supply of SALW. However, second generation SALW
programming has moved beyond a focus on supply
to also address the factors stimulating the demand
for arms, including poverty and lack of development. In 2006, for example, the Small Arms Survey
published a paper entitled “Demanding Attention:
Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand,”
which argued that interventions to restrict the supply of weapons would only succeed if factors driving
demand are carefully diagnosed and acted upon.”8
The AVR approach brings further evolution by
including analysis of how arms are integrated in a
community’s socio-economic, cultural and political
dynamics and looking at links from local through to
regional and international levels.9 Many governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have since launched initiatives to
ensure AVR efforts are linked to national and regional
development programmes and strategies. Currently,
100 countries have endorsed the Geneva Declaration
on Armed Violence and Development, which is a
high-level diplomatic initiative designed to encourage
states and civil society actors to achieve measurable
reductions in the global burden of armed violence
in conflict and non-conflict settings by 2015 (and
beyond). See Box 2 for a summary of milestones in
the evolution towards the current international AVR
agenda.
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Box 2 | Key AVR milestones
2001 | The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW is established,
requiring participating steps to enact measures to fight
illicit SALW manufacturing and trade in a broad range
of areas.
2005 | During the World Summit (High Level Plenary
Meeting of the 60th Session of the General Assembly),
global leaders recognise the strong link between development, peace, security and human rights.10
2006 | The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and
Development is adopted by 42 states. Now endorsed by
over 100 states, it recognises clear links between armed
violence and development.
2009 | The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) publishes a report titled Armed Violence Reduction:
Enabling Development, which introduces the ‘AVR lens’.
2010 | The Norwegian Government and the UNDP organise the Oslo Conference on Armed Violence -Achieving
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to “generate
international momentum to ensure that commitments to
armed violence reduction and prevention are included in
the High Level Plenary Meeting on the MDGs, and reflected
in subsequent MDG and developmental strategies through
to 2015.”11 More than 60 countries agree to measures to
address armed violence.12

The OECD, at the forefront of promoting a greater
understanding of the links between armed violence
and development, has developed a variety of tools and
methods to aid practitioners in developing effective
AVR programmes. One of these tools is the AVR
lens, an analytical framework that captures the key
elements and levels of armed violence, namely the:
>

people affected by armed violence (victims and
wider communities)13

>

perpetrators of armed violence, and their motives14

>

instruments of armed violence15, in particular
their availability and supply

>

wider institutional and cultural environment that
may enable or protect against armed violence16

A diverse range of organisations are implementing
AVR-related initiatives in different programming
contexts (eg high rates of urban criminal violence
to protracted post-conflict insecurity) that focus on
different aspects of the ‘AVR lens’. These include
UN agencies such as the UNDP Bureau for Crisis
Prevention and Recovery and the World Health
Organisation’s Violence and Injury Prevention programme, as well as numerous governmental and
non-governmental organisations working at regional,
national and sub-national levels. In some countries
however, these initiatives may not be referred to using
the AVR label.17

© DDG/DRC Uganda

2012 | Global civil society alliance for AVR is established
to promote innovative and evidence-based strategies to
create effective national action plans and programmes
that reduce armed violence.
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Figure 1 | The OECD’s AVR Lens

INSTITUTIONS

GLOBAL
both formal institutions
of governance and
informal (traditional
and cultural) norms,
rules and practices

REGIONAL

NATIONAL

LOCAL

INSTRUMENTS
includes the unregulated
availability and distribution
of SALW, mines, explosive
remnants of war (ERW),
and factors affecting
their supply

PEOPLE
individuals,
communities and
societies affected
by armed violence

AGENTS
perpetrators of armed
violence and motivations
for acquisition and misuse
of arms (demand factors)

Source: OECD | Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development | 2009

A distinguishing element of the AVR lens is its
emphasis on risk factors which exist and interact
at different levels, from local to global, and that it
“…encourages practitioners to think outside of
particular programming mandates and consider the
entirety of the problem at hand.”18 This policy brief
will use the AVR lens as a basis for analysing the
AVR-related programmes being implemented by
mine action organisations.

THE ROLE OF MINE ACTION
Instruments of armed violence
The majority of mine/ERW operators involved in
AVR have focused primarily on a single element of
the AVR lens—the instruments of violence. This is
not particularly surprising given that they have long
worked on the removal and destruction of other
instruments of violence, ie mines and other ERW.
Mine action organisations are also used to working
with security actors such as the military and police
and, due to their ability to operate in challenging environments, they are often among the only organisations capable of safely collecting and disposing of
these items.

Several mine action organisations have established
dedicated, stand-alone SALW and munitions destruction programmes, including in those countries
where they have not previously been involved in
mine action. MAG, for example, launched a PSSM
programme in Burundi in 2009, working first with
the police and then with the military to survey weapons and munitions stockpiles, collect and destroy
volatile or surplus SALW and ammunition, refurbish
armouries and train armourers.19 Similarly, UNMAS
was requested by the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire
to provide assistance to the military, gendarmerie20
and the police with securing the numerous storage
depots and armouries that had been looted and
destroyed during the conflict in 2010-11, and with
strengthening ammunition management capacity.
UNMAS contracted HALO Trust to implement the
project.21 Neither had previously worked in Côte
d’Ivoire, which does not have a mine/ERW contamination problem and, as a result, there had been
no previous mine action involvement.
SALW and munitions collection and destruction, as
well as PSSM programmes, have developed into distinct categories of operations for several organisations,
signalling a clear broadening of their mandates and
5 | 16
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objectives. These programmes seek to reduce the risk of unplanned explosions at munitions sites, prevent loss and theft from SALW and munitions
stockpiles, and reduce the number of SALW in circulation. UNMAS, for
example, played a lead role in coordinating the emergency response to the
ammunition depot explosions that took place in Congo-Brazzaville in March
2012. This was the first time that UNMAS had led an emergency response
to an ammunition depot explosion. Although UNMAS had no prior mine
action involvement in the Republic of Congo, it was able, at short notice, to
deploy personnel to Brazzaville. Several mine/ERW operators have been
involved in the clearance operations, eg, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
(MSB), Demeter and MAG.
Some programmes also try to strengthen the capacity of national authorities,
such as the national military and police, to safely handle, manage and store
their stockpiles. The OAS, for example, had worked in Guatemala on mine
action. Although Guatemala closed its mine action programme in 2005 after
completing its clearance obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention, the military contacted the OAS several years later to assist with
the disposal of unstable white phosphorous munitions. Based on its contacts
within the military and its reputation in mine action, the OAS has been able
to use this initial request for assistance as the basis for building a wider SALW
and munitions destruction programme with the military in Guatemala.22
However, dealing with the instruments of violence, although necessary, is
only one of the elements identified in the AVR lens as essential for effectively
addressing the problem of armed violence. In recognition of this, some mine/
ERW operators have begun to move beyond a sole focus on the instruments
of violence, to also address the other elements of the AVR lens, ie perpetrators
of armed violence, those affected by it, and formal institutions.

Beyond the instruments
Several mine action organisations have moved beyond a focus on the instruments of armed violence to implement innovative programmes, some of
which have little to do with mine action, munitions or even SALW control.
AOAV, for example, began its activities in Liberia in 2006 with a Weapons
and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) programme. However, in January 2008,
the organisation significantly broadened its mandate in the country by
launching a training and reintegration programme.23 The programme is for
(i) male and female ex-combatants excluded from Liberia’s Disarmament,
Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) process and (ii)
male and female war-affected youth engaged in illegal and criminal activities,
or at high risk of re-engaging in conflict. The programme therefore targets
the perpetrators of armed violence, ie ex-combatants and at risk youth, by
providing them with the means to pursue alternative, non-violent livelihoods
through targeted vocational training, psychosocial counselling and sustained
reintegration support. And although the training and reintegration programme
was initially implemented alongside its WAD programme, it has become
AOAV’s only programme in Liberia.
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HALO Trust in Afghanistan has adopted a slightly different approach.
HALO Trust is employing former combatants and training them as community-based deminers in coordination with the Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Programme.24 While the overall objective of HALO Trust’s
clearance programme is to remove the threat of mines/ERW, the strategy of
employing ex-combatants as deminers also contributes to wider efforts to
promote peace and stability by providing them with alternate livelihood opportunities. Reintegrees receive a salary from day one of demining training,
which immediately relieves the financial pressure to return to conflict. According to HALO Trust, the retention rate of reintegrees within the demining sector is 70 per cent, indicating that the programme is helping to change
the behaviour of perpetrators of armed violence.
Other organisations have also tried to address multiple elements of the AVR
lens in an integrated way. Since 2008 for example, DDG has been implementing Community Safety Programmes (CSP) in Somaliland25, South Sudan
and Uganda26. Although DDG initially intervened in each of these countries
to conduct mine/ERW clearance, the organisation has expanded its mandate
to tackle the threat posed by armed violence. In Somaliland, DDG completely phased out its demining operations and is focusing solely on community
safety by facilitating the development of community safety plans27, delivering
firearms safety education along with conflict management training28, and
installing safe-storage devices29 for firearms to reduce the risks associated
with unsafe storage of SALW and misuse. In Uganda, DDG facilitates peace
meetings between different clans, as well as regular meetings between communities and their security providers, and is also delivering conflict management education to the police and the military. DDG’s approach goes
beyond trying to secure access to or prevent the proliferation of arms and
ammunition, to also try to change attitudes and behaviour, and strengthen
local institutions and community capacity and resilience. Also of note is the
fact that DDG is trying to strengthen programming synergies with its parent
organisation, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), in an effort to enhance
the impact of combined community safety and development programming.
DRC focuses on a range of sectors, including housing and small-scale infrastructure, income generation, social rehabilitation and food security and
agricultural rehabilitation and development.
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While each of DDG’s three Community Safety
Programmes has been developed according to local
context and needs, they share some similarities. For
example, the programmes:
>

are informed by DDG’s AVR framework

>

are community-driven with a strong emphasis
on community capacity-building

>

include a range of activities that target: the
instruments of violence, eg safe storage devices
for SALW and ERW collection and destruction;
perpetrators of violence, eg providing conflict
management training and facilitating peace
meetings; and institutions, eg establishment of
community and district-level committees dealing
with community safety issues

Both DDG and HI’s community safety programmes
draw upon community safety interventions implemented by organisations such as the South Eastern and
Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), Saferworld, UNDP and national NGOs in the Balkans.
For example, Handicap International noted that its
SALW RE training materials were developed based
on materials produced by SEESAC and the Bonn
International Center for Conversion’s (BICC) Training
and Education on Small Arms (TRESA) modules.
Despite differences in their programmes, objectives
and methods, this subset of broader AVR programmes share one central characteristic: a people
centred-approach. The concerns and perceptions of
the victims and local communities affected by armed
violence—the ultimate beneficiaries—figure as a
key element in the design and implementation of
these programmes. Communities are not only surveyed and consulted, but are often integrally involved

© Handicap International

HI is also moving in a similar direction. It began its
work in Libya in April 2011 with an emergency
response project focused on clearing mine/ERW
contamination resulting from the country’s civil
conflict.30 However, the rapidly increasing number
of deaths and injuries resulting from the uncontrolled
proliferation and misuse of SALW in Benghazi led

a more integrated intervention that addresses multiple elements of the AVR lens.

HI to expand its project. HI’s intervention, initially
restricted to eastern Libya, focuses on changing
civilian behaviour by increasing public awareness
of the risks posed by SALW. HI’s risk awareness
project consists of delivering SALW Risk Education
(RE) sessions, similar in approach to Mine Risk
Education, and using the media to publicise SALW
risk messages. By seeking to change how people view
SALW, HI is tackling both the perpetrators of armed
violence as well as those affected. With the expansion
of its project to Tripoli in 2012, HI is also moving
towards a community safety approach by engaging
directly with the authorities and civil society to ensure an institutional shift aimed at deterring civilian
SALW ownership. In these ways, HI has opted for

in the programmes themselves. Invariably, the level
of community involvement in a programme depends
on the operator’s methodology, but the close involvement of communities represents an important step
towards ensuring these programmes are needs-based,
effective and sustainable.
These examples illustrate the expanded scope and
involvement of mine action organisations in AVR.
They should however be viewed as one element of
the AVR lens which complement the interventions
of a wide range of other actors involved in reducing
armed violence. The reasons behind this shift are
varied, and are examined in greater detail in the following section.
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MINE ACTION TO AVR: REASONS FOR THE EXPANSION
GICHD’s study of mine action organisations that have ventured into the
realm of AVR revealed several motivating factors. The shift partly reflects
the fact that while 1,155 people were killed by mines and other ERW in 201031,
approximately 740,000 people die annually as a result of armed violence, including in non-conflict affected countries.32 DDG Somaliland, for example,
shifted from demining to community safety partly in response to a survey of
several communities identified as high and medium mine/ERW impacted,
which found that mines were not having as serious an impact on communities
as previously believed, whereas SALW and private ownership of ERW were
resulting in far more deaths and injuries.33
Mine action organisations are able to work in unstable, conflict-affected
contexts such as Afghanistan, Somalia and South Sudan, due to their
experience in responding to emergency mine/ERW contamination threats
during and immediately after conflicts. They are also used to adhering to
International Mine Action Standards and to undertaking quality control and
quality assurance for their mine action operations. This type of experience
and logistical expertise makes them well-placed to also respond to threats
related to SALW and munitions.
Another factor motivating this shift is the possibility that the generous funding previously made available for mine action will decrease beyond 2015.34
Mine action organisations are therefore expanding the range of services that
they provide to address a wider range of threats and make use of new funding
opportunities.
Progress on the legal, normative and diplomatic fronts (see Annex 1) has
also helped present operators with a framework within which to provide
affected states with AVR assistance. Regarding SALW control, examples
include the UN Programme of Action on SALW, the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines, the International Small Arms Control Standards,
and regional initiatives such as the Nairobi Protocol and the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention. On the AVR front,
the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, the Oslo
Commitments on Armed Violence and civil society efforts to establish a
global alliance on AVR have also focused international attention on the
problem of armed violence.
A final factor motivating this shift is that operators have received requests
for AVR-related assistance from contacts in the security forces in countries
where they previously worked. These relationships have, in some cases, helped
facilitate engagement in new areas, eg PSSM and SALW and munitions
destruction. For example, MAG’s PSSM programme in Somaliland evolved
based on a request from the national authorities.35 In 2008, MAG had
provided support and other expertise for the collection and destruction of
SALW. However, in 2010, the Police Commissioner in Somaliland’s capital,
Hargeisa, asked MAG to visit one of its main police armouries due to
concerns about the poor storage conditions of arms, ammunition and explosives, and the potential risks posed to police officers and civilians. Based on
this request, MAG conducted a survey of over 40 police armouries across
Somaliland, and used the findings to develop a multi-phased PSSM project
that began in mid-2011.
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GICHD STUDY ON MINE ACTION AND AVR:
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS
LEARNT
The GICHD’s research focused on documenting
examples where traditional mine/ERW operators
had expanded into AVR or public safety-related
programming. Based on an analysis of twelve programmes, the following are the main findings and
lessons learnt to date:
1. Most of the mine/ERW operators are concentrating on the instruments of violence: Most
of the operators involved in AVR-related programmes have opted to focus on one aspect of
the AVR lens, ie the instruments of violence.
Their programmes include collecting and destroying excess and unsafe SALW and ammunition,
promoting the physical security of arms and ammunition stores and raising awareness about the
risks of SALW. This reflects in part that mine
action organisations are used to dealing with
mines/ERW and have been able to also develop
programmes to tackle SALW and munitions as
a natural extension.
2. Some operators are charting new territory: A
few operators have, however, focused their interventions on different elements of the AVR
lens, such as the perpetrators of violence and
institutions, with a strong community focus. In
doing so, these operators are demonstrating that
they have the capacity to innovate and chart
new territory. DDG’s Community Safety
Programme approach and AOAV’s Post-Conflict
Rehabilitation and Reintegration Training project
in Liberia are clear examples of programmes
which are well beyond the scope of mine action.
These programmes recognise that reducing armed
violence requires changing behaviour and attitudes,
and they try to address some of the factors driving
armed violence, eg weak governance, limited
capacity and lack of livelihood opportunities.
Community involvement was cited by several
organisations as vital to relevance and to sustainable behaviour change.
3. National mine action authorities remain focused
on ‘traditional’ mine action: While the involvement
of mine/ERW operators and UNMAS in new
programming areas is moving forward, national
mine action authorities have remained focused
for the most part on ‘traditional’ mine action. In
fact, in many mine/ERW affected countries,

parallel coordination structures exist for small
arms control, eg national SALW focal points or
commissions; they typically have limited contact
with their mine action counterparts. There are
few examples of national mine action authorities
engaging in SALW and munitions-specific programmes. The Albanian Mine Action Executive
(AMAE) is among the exceptions. Following
the completion of the mine action programme in
Albania in 2009, AMAE used its mine action experience and capacity to address the clearance
of unexploded ordnance (UXO) hotspot areas
across the country that resulted from past explosions at ammunition depots or abandoned
army camps.36 Renamed the Albania Mine and
Munitions Coordination Office (AMMCO), it
is responsible for coordination, quality management, accreditation, community liaison and survivor assistance, among other things. However,
AMAE made the shift only once the mine/ERW
threat had been fully resolved. If capacity and
resources are available, national mine action
programmes should not wait until after the completion of their Article 5 clearance obligations to
facilitate the use of mine action organisations to
reduce armed violence.
4. Limited involvement in AVR-related policy
discussions at national level: Although mine/
ERW operators are making progress in implementing field level programmes, contact with
national SALW, SSR and DDR actors on strategy
and policy issues tends to be limited. In some
countries, operators are regarded by these actors
largely as operational service providers. Although
they have excelled at establishing effective
working relationships with security providers,
ie national militaries and the police, they generally do not engage in broader policy discussion
and processes. Those involved in PSSM programmes in particular tend to have limited
contact with national SALW focal points and
civil society organisations involved in SALW
control and broader AVR issues. For example,
in Côte d’Ivoire, UNMAS and HALO Trust
support the DDR process organised by the
DDR division of the UN mission in Côte
d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the National SALW
Commission by deploying technically qualified
staff to check weapons, inspect and identify
ammunition prior to their registration by the
UNOCI-DDR team, and advise on the temporary
storage of arms and ammunition. They do not
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however engage in strategic discussions regarding
the DDR process in Côte d’Ivoire. However,
there are exceptions; for example, in Libya, HI
is working with the Souk Al-Jouma Union of
NGOs and the Free Media Center, while in Somaliland, DDG works in partnership with local
peace building NGOs Haqsoor and Horn Peace.

men and boys who tend to be the main owners
of SALW. Women are encouraged to convince
their husbands to store their arms and ammunition safely. It has however been more difficult
to mainstream gender considerations into programmes that focus primarily on the instruments
of violence, eg SALW and munitions destruction
and PSSM.

5. Efforts to mainstream gender are mixed:
Some operators have taken steps to mainstream
gender considerations into their new programmes.
For example, although DanChurchAid did not
have a formal gender mainstreaming policy in
place, its SALW Awareness Raising and Risk
Education project in Burundi ensured that
women were encouraged to participate as trainers
and SALW risk education focal points, and were
represented in media-related materials.37 HI
drew upon its organisational policy on gender,
as well as various in-house gender mainstreaming
tools, for its SALW risk education project in
Libya. For example, HI works with local women’s
groups, and has adapted its RE methods to
reach out specifically to women, who are more
difficult to access in Libya. DDG does not have
a formal policy on gender but its Community
Safety Programme in Somaliland used several
approaches to take gender and diversity into
account. For example, DDG’s baseline surveys
collect sex and age disaggregated data, and both
male and female heads of household are interviewed. When DDG teams distribute safe storage
devices to households to promote the safe storage
of SALW and prevent misuse, they typically target

6. As UNMAS and several mine action organisations have ventured into the area of PSSM, the
following are some PSSM-specific reflections:
a. PSSM has become a new domain for mine
action organisations: Several of the main NGO
operators38 are implementing PSSM programmes
and, within the United Nations, UNMAS has
taken the lead on PSSM. PSSM has very clearly
become a new domain for mine action organisations, and is highly competitive. Although operators have not yet formed a global community
of practice to share information about programming approaches and lessons learnt, at field level
some have recognised that coordination is important, particularly when supporting the same
national authorities and trying to ensure a
consistent approach.
b. A holistic and sustainable approach to PSSM
is needed: PSSM programmes in conflict-affected
or fragile contexts require a holistic and sustainable
approach, which should involve a combination
of activities focused on strengthening the physical
security of stores and depots, improving ammunition and weapons management, and developing
capacity of national security actors.
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d. Donors and operators tend to emphasise
achievement of outputs instead of outcomes:
Some donors seem to be more interested in
funding short term “quick win” and high visibility
initiatives (eg destruction of MANPADS, SALW
and munitions) rather than longer term support
to develop capacity, standards, monitoring, etc.
Few donors request that reporting for these AVR
programmes be done in terms of outcomes, eg
improving public safety, reduced risk of harm to
civilians, reduced risk of SALW/munitions theft
and trafficking, etc. Results, particularly for the
PSSM and munitions/SALW destruction programmes, are largely measured in terms of outputs.
Organisations do not necessarily have the capacity to report on how their PSSM programmes
contribute to AVR/public safety-related outcomes.
e. Donor interest in ammunition management
capacity development is mixed: Donor interest
in strengthening the ammunition and weapons
management capacity of militaries in conflictaffected contexts is mixed. Some donors are
unaware of the potential risks posed by unsafe
ammunition management practice. Yet this preventive work costs far less than responding to
an unplanned explosion at a munitions site.39 In
many cases, it may be that donors are aware of
the potential risk but the problem remains unaddressed as their official aid agencies are not responsible for such programmes and their Ministries
of Defence are not involved in these countries.

© MAG Burundi

c. Gaining access to information and physical
access to stores and depots can be difficult:
Operators implementing PSSM programmes
typically encounter challenges in getting accurate
information about national stockpiles and gaining
access to depots and armouries, given that this
is closely linked to national security. Access to
information and physical access to stores and
depots is particularly challenging in countries
that are just emerging from conflict, and where
there is a real fear of a return to conflict and,
therefore, a desire to maintain national stockpiles
despite indications that munitions and arms may
be obsolete, degraded, dangerous and/or surplus
to requirements. Monitoring and assessing
stockpiles requires considerable trust on the part
of the national authorities, as knowledge of which
weapons and munitions are stored where, and
their individual state, could be misused by foreign
states or internal forces. Systems for storing
such information must therefore be secure, clearly
understood by national authorities, and be based
on clear agreements between operators and national authorities on how that information can
be used.
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f. Working with militaries can be challenging: Working with militaries
comes with its own set of challenges and opportunities. One challenge
several operators have encountered is that the decision-making process
is slow due to the command structure of militaries and the need to get
high-level approval for PSSM-related activities. This can result in delays
and slow the pace of the programme.
g. The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)40 provide
a sound basis for PSSM programmes: The IATG provide relevant
information for PSSM programmes in a relatively accessible format.
Although knowledge of the IATG is not essential for a typical mine action
programme, it is necessary for PSSM work. The IATG cover, in a comprehensive manner, key topics such as ammunition and explosive storage
principles, transportation regulation, explosive safety regulation, quantity
distance calculations, etc, and lay out the standards and materials required
for the construction of ammunition stores and barracades. However,
operators also recognise that PSSM advice and support needs to be
adapted to the local context and that a rigid application of European
standards is not always feasible.
h. Opportunities exist to draw upon the Quality Management expertise
in mine action: In countries where operators are implementing PSSM
programmes, national standards and related accreditation and Quality
Management (QM) processes are not yet in place. As there is no clear
legal framework, the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) used by
the operators to guide their PSSM operations are often the only reference
documents. As external QM is not yet well developed, and the level of
internal QM varies, these initiatives could potentially benefit from the
QM experience and skills developed within the mine action sector.
i.

Mine action organisations are engaging ammunition management
experts for PSSM programmes: Mine action organisations that have
traditionally employed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) qualified personnel are also starting to engage individuals with ammunition management
expertise, similar to the UK Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO)
qualification. Some have also employed advisors with construction or
civil engineering backgrounds to oversee the construction/rehabilitation
of storage facilities.
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CONCLUSIONS
Based on the findings of the GICHD study, it is clear that the role of mine
action organisations in supporting AVR is invaluable. While partly driven
by changes in funding and international political environments, their relevant
expertise, the innovative approaches that they are adopting (eg towards community safety), as well as the relationships they have already built with national
security sector actors give them unique insight, leverage and opportunity to
contribute to AVR.
Mine action organisations should continue to employ their expertise and experience to address wider security challenges. More, however, should be
done by national mine action programmes to explore opportunities to facilitate the entry of mine action organisations to support AVR, where capacity
and resources are available and the context appropriate. It is clear that efforts
to reduce armed violence require multi-faceted solutions and mine action organisations should continue to move towards programming that goes beyond
the instruments of armed violence. Some may argue that this shift towards
AVR is a diversion from the core mandate of mine action organisations.
While this may be true and different organisations may, quite reasonably,
choose differently whether to expand the scope of their operations, in many
contexts the threats to safety and security posed by arms are far higher than
threats from mines and ERW. Given that mine action organisations have expertise and experience which can be applied to prevent armed violence and
promote public safety, it is a natural and welcome shift for them to expand
their scope of activities into AVR programming.
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ANNEX 1 | SALW and AVR-related Agreements and Standards

Name

Description

UN Firearms Protocol (2001/in force 2005)

States required to secure and track firearms, their various components
and ammunition at the time of manufacture, import, export and transit.

UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat,
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) (2001)

State parties required to take steps to fight illicit SALW manufacturing
and trade in a broad range of areas, with follow-up meetings held biannually.

Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)

Aimed at eliminating illicit trade and end use of conventional weapons,
but no agreement on treaty text has yet been reached.

International Small Arms Control
Standards (ISACS) (2012)

Provides guidance (mainly for UN agencies supporting states in controlling
SALW) on stockpile management, marking, record-keeping, tracing,
and destroying illicit or unwanted arms.

International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (2011)

Provides guidance to states on establishing standards and procedures for
effective stockpile management.

OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms
and Light Weapons (2003)

Provides guidance for states to implement the OSCE Document on SALW,
intended to minimise illegal SALW circulation.

OSCE Handbook of Best Practices
on Conventional Ammunition (2008)

Aims to guide policy-making of participating States on the destruction
of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonation devices,
and stockpile management and control.

GICHD Guide to Ammunition Storage (2008)

Highlights good practices in the safe storage of ammunition.

Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Storage
of Military Ammunition and Explosives (2010)

Establishes safety principles to be used between host countries and NATO
forces in storing conventional ammunition and explosives.

Inter-American Convention against the Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Material
(CIFTA) (1997/in force 1998)

Aimed at eradicating illicit manufacture and trade in SALW. Provisions
include marking, record keeping, confiscation or forfeiture of firearms,
strengthening of controls at export points, and cooperation between
member states.

Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) Convention (2006/in force 2009)

Signing parties must ensure safe management of national stockpiles, and
dispose of excess or obsolete stocks.

Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control,
and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons
in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa
(“Nairobi Protocol”) (2004/in force 2006)

Measures aimed at harmonising legislation between member states,
strengthening law enforcement capacity, cross-border and regional
cooperation, stockpile management, and sensitisation of populations
on the dangers of SALW.

Andean Community Decision 552: Andean Plan to
Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (2003)

Seeks to strengthen national capacity and regional cooperation in
controlling the manufacture, trade, possession and use of SALW.

Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Declaration
on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2011)

Member states commit to ensuring implementation of the Programme of
Action, strengthen security sectors, harmonise and strengthen legislation,
cooperate in stockpile management and destruction, and push for conclusion
of a global Arms Trade Treaty.

Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Firearms Protocol (2001/in force 2004)

Measures aimed at eradicating illicit manufacture of SALW, regulating
trade of (legal) SALW, and harmonising legislation across member states.

EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998)

Builds on the eight criteria adopted in 1991 for states to use in allowing
arms exports. Also includes reporting and consultation mechanisms to
ensure consistent interpretation of criteria.

EU Council Common Position (2008)

Replaces and expands upon 1998 Code of Conduct.
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